Conventional  methods for the management of natural resources are generally centralized policies that focus on equitable distribution and management of  a shared resources. The temptation for central authorities to affect changes and impose rules  is based on the assumption that  the users of a shared  resources face commons dilemma ;  and hence the users do not cooperate and are involved in maximizing their selfish immediate gain regardless of the common good. However recent empirical research  by Ostrom (1999) showed that management of shared resources is too complex to be regulated by central authority because such centralized policies are generally based on objective analysis and will not  produce the intended optimal outcomes.  Other studies from economics or  those related to the use and access of common resources Sugden (1989)  show that there could be conditions under which rules regulating the use of  a common resources  can emerge and evolve  overtime without an external influence or central authority. This paper presents an agent based model to study the emergence of  resources sharing conventions for  common pool resources.